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Engaging the Mental 
Wars of Our Times
Dr. Jan van Vliet is Professor of Economics at Dordt 
College. His most recent publication is The Rise of Reformed 
System: The Intellectual Heritage of William Ames. He is cur-
rently translating the Kuyper-Islam project, for the Kuyper 
Center for Public Theology at Princeton Seminary. 
by Jan van Vliet
Statement of the Challenge: 
“Let’s Blame the French”
Not long ago a leading newsmagazine proclaimed 
that the popular Low-Carb Atkins diet is all but 
dead. The article, titled “Low-Carb Lament,” gave 
statistics and documentary evidence suggesting the 
rapid rise, sustained popularity, and then collapse 
of the low-carb diet industry that flourished for 
only about a decade.1 Even though that same low-
carb diet is again becoming popular with the ad-
vent of the paleolithic diet,2 its rise and fall might 
be a good metaphor for this question of postmod-
ernism: Do there lie within postmodernism the 
seeds of its own destruction?
A new ethos has become overwhelmingly dom-
inant in the academy. Whether its attendant mood 
was first pitched from this particular gatekeep-
er—academia—or from another, as some would 
argue, doesn’t really matter. “Postmodernism” has 
now gained admission into the culture at large. 
This new spirit rather successfully insinuated it-
self within the icons of early 21st–century Western 
civilization. By this I mean the institutions regu-
lating political-economic life, the media, fashion, 
Hollywood, art, architecture, and, yes, even some 
quarters of the church, that old bastion of tradition 
and “truth.” But Postmodernism has gone further 
than merely insinuation, although this is always a 
first and necessary step. It is responsible for the re-
construction of pretty much everything, from of-
fice buildings to systems of thought. It has come to 
roost, permanently it would appear (if it really ever 
left at all), in the ivory tower of the academy, from 
whence it now promulgates its “new” philosophy.
It was only after a French intellectual elite ar-
ticulated its opposition to certain Enlightenment 
principles that “postmodernism” became common 
currency. Now, this turn is not necessarily bad; I 
think it is generally agreed that all new systems of 
thought, theologies, belief systems are created al-
most overwhelmingly because of initial opposition 
to existing norms and patterns. But this opposi-
tional stance is hardly how new life is sustained. In 
other words, some positive distinctives must shine 
forth from the new system of thought, in this case, 
to lend it credibility and provide its permanent au-
thenticity and legitimacy. That is to say, we derive 
our enduring identity from what we are, not from 
Editor’s Note: Dr. Jan van Vliet’s paper is an edited version of a talk delivered at the annual meetings of the Evangelical 
Theological Society, in Washington, D. C., November 15, 2006.
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frame of reference (overwhelming ethos), knowl-
edge has been replaced with interpretation (specific 
impact). And while the vehicle of communication 
is still language, language is itself interpretation. 
Truth, then, is a construct of its discourse.3 To see 
truth otherwise is to impose one’s value-laden and 
totalizing meanings on another. Foucault, nothing 
if not consistent, argued that this imposition is the 
ultimate act of aggression. Communication thus 
becomes hostile discourse, dangerous in its subver-
sive tendencies because of the implicit exertion of 
illegitimate power. Although Foucault died before 
he could make this final assertion, to take his posi-
tion to the logical conclusion would be to say that 
the optimal world is the world of silence.
More to the point for our purposes, post-struc-
turalist Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) sought to 
destroy all writing by demonstrating its inevitable 
falsehood. As the “chief theoretical architect of de-
construction,”4 Derrida applied very specifically to 
literary theory the more comprehensive attitude 
and practice applied to all human knowledge, 
language, and behavior. Broadly speaking, the 
purpose of deconstruction was an exposé of the 
West’s singularly oppressive treatment of all non-
Western people groups, women, non-Caucasians, 
and non-heterosexuals. This oppression resulted 
from the prevailing social constructs (what I have 
called cultural gatekeepers), which reflected supe-
riority, prejudice, aggression, and marginalization. 
Everyday language is not neutral, said Derrida, 
echoing Foucault. Literary theory must be over-
hauled, and it must lose its claim to meaning.
In this regard it was not all well, however, be-
tween Foucault and Derrida. Because Foucault 
saw Descartes as the epitome of the Age of Reason, 
Derrida held that Foucault, in using the language 
of reason to defend Descarte’s method, was him-
self a victim (and thus product) of Enlightenment 
thinking and thus betrayed himself as a subscriber 
to the Enlightenment’s prevailing episteme. 
According to Derrica, a text does not necessar-
ily reflect one prevailing power structure; instead, 
any text can hold a multitude of interpretations, 
even if the author’s own meaning can be ascer-
tained. What is important, no, the only thing pos-
sible, is interpretation because the author himself 
or herself cannot escape his or her own ties to the 
what we oppose. And postmodernism has certainly 
done this as well. That is why we call it “decon-
struction” rather than “destruction.”
In its opposition to Modernism, the postmod-
ern mind identifies itself as placing the central as-
sumptions of Enlightenment epistemology under 
interrogation. These assumptions have to do with 
the following Enlightenment myths:
1) the myth of progress: not necessarily 
good, from our observations of known 
realities;
2) the myth of truth: not certain and purely 
rational, but instead emotive and intui-
tive and discovered in community;
3) and the myth of knowledge: not objec-
tive, because historically and culturally 
conditioned.
In fact, this postmodern idea extends beyond 
our perceptions of truth to its essence: there is 
no absolute truth. Truth only exists relative to 
the community in which its believer participates. 
These ideas, it is held, are the logical outgrowth 
of the chief emblems of Modernism—Western 
dominance, Christianity, free market econom-
ics, and individualism. This about-face from the 
Modernist assumptions—the “post-modern turn” 
—has led to an “uncentering” (decentering?) of 
the ethos of society, what Michel Foucault (1926-
84) calls “heterotopia.” It is heterogeneity that 
most captures 21st–century pluralism.
This decentered ethos drives—and is itself 
driven by—a literary theory called deconstruction. 
This theory has great import for “doing theology.” 
Because there can be no totalizing epistemological 
In the face of the postmodern 
claim (itself totalizing, notice) 
that truth is found only in 
community, it is notable that 
Bloom uses this concept of 
“community” to describe that 
one universal group of seekers of 
transcendent truth.
12     Pro Rege—September 2014
episteme of the prevailing culture. All meaning, 
then, is socially contrived, so there can be no to-
talizing meaning/truth. In fact, “objectivity” and 
“truth” are myth, a group’s story. By definition, 
then, to claim objective truth for your “story” is to 
dismiss all others’ stories or “truths” as false.
Meeting The Challenge in the Theological Task: 
Or “How We Got Here”
In this “postmodern”5 period, when all stories 
claim equal validity, Nancey Murphy reminds us 
that fundamentalism and liberalism have pro-
ceeded along separate theological tracks but all 
the while are indebted to one intellectual lineage, 
joined at the philosophical hip, so to speak. The 
track, she says, begins at the trunk from rational-
ist Descartes (1596-1650); proceeds along the 
thought of the first of the holy trinity of classi-
cal British empiricists, John Locke of tabula rasa 
fame (1632-1704); and ends with the third, skep-
tic Scotsman David Hume (1711-76). And here 
comes the fork in the road. It was “common sense” 
realist Thomas Reid (1710-96) who built upon 
this common intellectual dependency to provide 
the superstructure of the Princeton theology (and 
thus fundamentalism/evangelicalism). The theo-
logical counterpart, liberalism, driven by co-de-
pendent Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), 
had its post-Humean origins with Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), whose dogmatic slumber was so 
rudely interrupted by empiricist Hume’s radical 
skepticism. Recognizing this common intellectual 
heritage helps us set up our theological how-to 
model, conceived a little more broadly. 
But we must go beyond mere recognition of 
these common intellectual roots. We are called to 
defend the concept of transcendent truth, a norm 
for belief and behavior that is beyond and above 
ourselves. There is, I want to argue, a real and true 
metaphysic. What’s more, this truth can be known 
truly, if not exhaustively. There is a true and dis-
coverable ontology, epistemology, and ethic. And 
those are grounded in the creator/creature rela-
tionship. These are the foundations and presup-
positions upon which the task of pedagogy and 
learning progress. We do not have the luxury to 
engage in abstract philosophizing for its own sake, 
although there is fundamentally nothing wrong 
with seeking truth as an end in itself. One will 
ultimately be led to contemplation of the divine, 
even by this route. But this is not Athens of old. 
So I want to bring one more weapon (is this not 
just one more dimension of the current “cultural 
wars”?) into my methodological armory. 
I introduce the thought of one Allan Bloom, a 
“front-line fighter in the mental wars of our times.”6 
In 1987 this highly-esteemed Jewish-American in-
tellectual rocked first the academic world and then 
mainstream culture with his massive critique of 
American (read Western) education:
The real community of  man, in the midst of  all 
the self-contradictory simulacra7 of  community, is 
the community of  those who seek truth, of  the 
potential knowers . . . of  all men to the extent they 
desire to know. But in fact, this includes only a 
few, the true friends, as Plato was to Aristotle at 
the very moment they were disagreeing about the 
nature of  the good. They were absolutely one soul 
as they looked at the problem. This, according to 
Plato, is the only real friendship, the only real com-
mon good. . . . They have a true community that is 
exemplary for all the other communities.8
In the face of the post-modern claim (itself to-
talizing, notice) that truth is found only in com-
munity, it is notable that Bloom uses this concept 
of “community” to describe that one universal 
group of seekers of transcendent truth. Other com-
munities, claims Bloom, are but “simulacra,” pre-
tenders, to true community. And he does so in 
language that we (and even his 1987 contempo-
raries) would consider highly politically incorrect 
(because it is totalizing and oppressive). The mo-
tive for Bloom’s remarks, the form and content, 
the words used and the message conveyed (Man, 
Truth, Knowers, the Good) must sound odd, 
even offensive to (post)modern ears. How would 
Foucault or Derrida respond to such “totalizing” 
claims? The line is drawn in the sand. 
Why does Bloom make this assertion? In his 
penetrating and luminous analysis of what he calls 
“the closing of the American mind,” Bloom sug-
gests that Descartes and Pascal “afford a peculiar 
and powerful perspective on life’s perennial prob-
lems. They weave the fabric of souls.”9 The intellec-
tual history and literary tradition of (first, France, 
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and then) the West, has historically produced what 
he terms a “cast of mind:” 
Descartes and Pascal represent a choice between 
reason and revelation, science and piety, the choice 
from which everything else follows…. These great 
opponents, whom no synthesis can unite…set 
in motion a dualism that we recognize when we 
speak of  both French clarity and of  French pas-
sion…. Both Enlightenment and Catholic thought 
have found their special home in France for more 
than three centuries. Descartes and Pascal gave ac-
counts . . . of  the West’s common faith, Christian-
ity, and at the same time situated them with respect 
to that other, more distant, source of  inspiration, 
Greece.10
Bloom even asserts that the ground of this 
“common faith” was the Bible. Scripture is a 
“means to furnish the mind,” for a “life based on 
the Book is closer to the truth [;…] it provides 
the material for deeper research in and access to 
the real nature of things…. [W]ithout a book of 
similar gravity, the mind remains unfurnished.”11 
These resources deepen and broaden our intellec-
tual horizon in our search for ultimate meaning. 
In consequence, Bloom’s assessment of the post-
structural drift in Western culture is not optimis-
tic. The postmodern ethos, laments Bloom, is the 
final, and not entirely unexpected, step in the utter 
dissolution of the search for meaning in the West:
[Postmodernism] is the last predictable stage in 
the suppression of  reason and the denial of  the 
possibility of  truth in the name of  philosophy…. 
A cheapened interpretation of  Nietzsche liberates 
us from the objective imperatives of  the texts that 
might have liberated us from our increasingly low 
and narrow horizon.12
Before we proceed to our lesson from history 
and then to a brief examination of what we can 
learn from this for the task of doing theology in the 
21st–century postmodern ethos, consider a brief 
word on Blaise Pascal (1623-62).13 Interestingly, 
the skeptical arguments raised in his Pensees 
were originally intended to deny the possibil-
ity of knowledge. But like Descartes’ Meditations, 
Pascal’s work tries to apply them to a positive end. 
Pascal demonstrates the explanatory superiority of 
Christianity that makes Christian belief rational. 
Thus, even while holding that “the heart has its 
reasons which reason does not know,” Pascal works 
in the shadow of Descartes. The former’s unique 
apologetic attempt makes singular reliance on rea-
son and probability (or relies solely on reason and 
probability?). It is only in the context of his broad-
er Pensees that a distinct presuppositional approach 
becomes evident. Only in this way can he use rea-
son (practical) to demonstrate the inadequacy of 
reason (evidential).
In addressing the task of theology, can we be 
refreshingly syncretistic? Can we have our episte-
mological cake and eat it too? Why can we not 
have God, Descartes, and Pascal, all three? I sug-
gest that this approach may be the only hope we 
have to do theology in this post-Enlightenment 
context.
Having set the rules of the game, so to speak, 
(common intellectual heritage, the centrality of 
“community” as seekers of transcendent truth,” 
and Pascal’s bold use of reason to supplant its own 
centrality), I now want to illustrate how this kind 
of a model can help us in the theological task. We 
can learn from a great example of pre-Enlighten-
ment philosophical/epistemological syncretism 
that gave post-Reformation theology a very strong 
push in the direction of further development and 
refinement: the theologian William Ames.
A Lesson from the Early Seventeenth Century: 
“Or Jerusalem and Athens and the French”
Puritan theologian William Ames (1576-1633) 
Puritan theologian William 
Ames (1576–1633) 
came on the scene in the 
development of theological 
system at a time when the 
influence of Aristotle had 
made significant resurgence 
in the academies of Europe.
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came on the scene in the development of theologi-
cal system at a time when the influence of Aristotle 
had made significant resurgence in the academies 
of Europe. Stripped of his academic degrees at the 
University of Cambridge in 1610 for refusing to 
relent of a “rigid” sort of Puritanism, Ames set 
off for the refreshingly freer intellectual climes of 
the United Provinces. After brief sojourns in The 
Hague, Leiden, and Dordrecht, where he was ad-
visor to the president of that great synod (1618), 
he was appointed to the faculty of the Franeker 
Academy in 1620. It was from this intellectual 
backwater that Ames wielded tremendous power 
and influence from study and lectern and, occa-
sionally, from pulpit. With the likes of Ames on 
its faculty, however, the reputation of Franeker 
rapidly and ever so briefly came to rival the bet-
ter-known and prestigious University of Leiden. 
Indeed, it was to this geographical outpost of early 
modern Europe that the brightest students from 
all corners of Europe gravitated. Interestingly, one 
Rene Descartes enrolled April 16, 1629, surely 
among the most famous of Franeker’s early seven-
teenth-century students. It was in Franeker, right 
under the nose of Ames, that Descartes composed 
his Meditations (while Discourse was written in 
Leeuwarden, the capital of Friesland). “I think 
I have found,” he wrote in 1630, “how one can 
demonstrate metaphysical truth in such a way 
which is more evident than the demonstrations of 
geometry.”14 Now it is highly unlikely he learned 
this in the Learned Doctor Ames’ class on Moral 
Theology.
The Academy had been established in 1585 
to perpetuate the Calvinistic faith in northern 
Netherlands. But the legacy of Aristotle reigned 
supreme, and Ames found himself doing intellec-
tual/theological battle on three fronts rather than 
the two which he was expecting, in which he was 
specialist, and for which he had been appointed 
to the faculty. Thus, in addition to the war against 
popery and Arminianism, in the form of Jesuit 
Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621) and Jacobus 
Arminius (1560-1609) and his ilk respectively, 
Professor Ames was pushed into battle with the 
ghost of Aristotle in the form of faculty colleagues.
For our purposes, it is of great interest how 
this war was fought. Ames retained significant 
traces of Aristotle’s method, even as he eschewed 
The Philosopher’s metaphysic. For Ames there was 
no place for speculative philosophy, only biblical 
revelation. Aristotle drove a bifurcation between 
speculative science (theoretical) and practical sci-
ence (ethics). This Aristotelian distinction be-
tween theoretical and practical, Ames held, had 
no place in the Protestant academy. In fact, he 
appropriated wholesale the entire epistemological 
content of one Peter Ramus (1515-72), the spec-
tacular French philosopher of the sixteenth cen-
tury who was killed in the famous massacre of St. 
Bartholomew’s Day in Paris. As a French Humanist 
and pedagogue, Ramus sought to democratize 
education and came into immediate conflict 
with the more aristocratic tradition of Scholastic 
method (Aristotle). Following his conversion and 
as a Hugenot, Ramus believed that concepts and 
abstractions of the human mind draw their valid-
ity, not from temporal or expedient constructs but 
from eternal truth in the mind of God. Universals, 
he held, are inferred from humanity’s experience 
and then related to infinity; they are not known 
through syllogistic argumentation from universal 
principles that are merely probable. Absolute truth 
becomes available through the careful analysis of 
human perception. These facts could be analyzed 
in a series of successive dichotomies. This method 
of logic came to be called the Ramist method. And 
the only and ultimate goal of the Ramist philoso-
phy was the practical utility of the arts (learning) 
for everyday life. Ramism came to be considered a 
genuinely Christian, even Calvinistic philosophy.15
The sea change that Ames’ appropriation 
of Ramism meant for traditional developing 
Reformation theology can be seen in his definition 
of theology. “Theology,” opined Ames, “is the doc-
trine or teaching [doctrina] of living to God.” In 
one sentence he dismissed all earlier rationalistic 
definitions of theology by centering sacred doc-
trine in what one did.
At the same time, however, Ames knew how 
to despoil the Egyptians. Syllogistic reasoning had 
a central place in the logic of “Dr. Dialectician” 
himself, even as he dismissed the author. Aristotle 
could still be plundered. Aristotle could make 
sense of observed reality by reasoning syllogisti-
cally from major premise to conclusion in the fol-
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lowing way:
Major premise: “All men are mortal” [universal 
from observed experience];
Minor premise: “Socrates is a man” [from ob-
servation];
Deduction: “Socrates is mortal” [necessary 
conclusion].
Ames could conclude from the major premise with 
the use of scriptural principles: 
Major premise: “He that lives in sin shall die” 
[universal from scripture];
Minor premise: “I live in sin [judgment of 
the conscience measuring behavior against 
the synderesis, the standard of scripture, the 
moral law];
Deduction: “ I shall die” [necessary conclu-
sion].
Ames’ deductive logic is syllogistically demonstrat-
ed precisely as Aristotle would have required, with 
this exception: Scripture represents the eternal and 
abiding universals and the measure against which 
the minor premise is judged. The conclusion (de-
duction) flows purely from measuring behavior 
against Scripture and then submitting to scriptural 
universals (the major premise). Ames demon-
strates that what some consider to be the intellec-
tually vilest and most brutish form of Aristotelian 
reductionism can be applied to sacred truth.
This demonstration shows, however briefly, 
that during this pre-Enlightenment period there 
were many points of intersection among Aristotle, 
Descartes, rationalism, Scripture, and the task of 
theology. Rationalism was there; Descartes just 
hadn’t articulated it yet. And what Derrida said of 
Foucault, we could say of Pascal: he, too, was im-
mersed in Descartes. If Ames had lived even a half-
generation longer, he would have been sandwiched 
between Aristotle and Descartes. Where would he 
have settled?16 The difference lies in the presuppo-
sitions one brings to the epistemological task. And 
this is exactly my point. Without an authoritative 
outside source, we come ungrounded, decentered, 
and have no functional operational grid in which, 
in this case, to do theology. We saw that both 
Ames and Pascal used the available epistemologi-
cal techniques to advance theology as, ultimately, 
something you do. Science advances piety.
Application for Today: “Will That Be French 
Cuisine or the Atkins Diet?”
Suggestions and recommendations on how to 
do theology in this current intellectual climate 
abound. An entire sub-industry has developed 
around this issue. Publications of all manner pro-
liferate, from popular how-to’s to heavier tomes 
and more significant assessments and evaluations. 
I am not going to repeat these here, although I will 
use some of the ideas proposed. But first, let’s go to 
a recent news report for inspiration.
It might be true that our mental health, in its 
totality, has been for too long dominated by the 
high carb bread and pasta created on the epistemo-
logical threshing floor of the Modernity project. 
Perhaps not all progress is good. It demonstrably 
has not been good for all. Perhaps we have been 
too glib in the “certainty” of our version of the 
truth and have been closed to the clamor of other 
voices, raised often in opposition. But should we 
cut out an entire food group? Are the high-fat, 
high-cholesterol foods offered by post-structur-
alism really that good for us as a singular dietary 
source? We are prepared and advised to jettison the 
old thinking that you can’t get enough protein, but 
too much of the protein of poststructuralism is not 
good either. It comes with all that unhealthy fat 
and cholesterol. Does this not argue for balance, 
for revisiting how truth is interpreted and deliv-
ered?
In adjusting to the intellectual and epistemo-
logical exigencies of today, we are called to re-ex-
amine our diet. Whatever diet we choose, we must 
all agree that we do need food. It is a question of 
finding the balanced diet that meets and exceeds 
all competing claims and interpretations of the 
truth.
But there are some irreducible minima in 
whatever diet we adopt. My survey from the avail-
We recognize the existence of 
transcendent truth that we 
as image-bearing creatures of 
God are equipped to access.
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able epistemological (and theological) smorgas-
bord leads me to load my plate with at least the 
following non-negotiable food groups:
(1) We recognize the existence of transcendent 
truth that we as image-bearing creatures of God are 
equipped to access. Theories of “truth” which deny 
the correspondence view ultimately fall short.17 In 
other words, our theories correctly describe reality, 
which exists independent of any knower. Reality 
is not a social construct. This world has objective 
features of the good, the true, and the beautiful to 
which we can make appeal. The problem lies with 
us. Pascal said “truth is so obscured nowadays, 
and lies so well established, that unless we love the 
truth we shall never recognize it.”18 Perhaps the 
deconstructionists rather than Bible believers are 
the obscurantists. Truth “must have its way with 
us.” We have not handled truth properly. We have 
not understood truth truly. We have not sought 
truth unswervingly. We have not pursued truth 
conscientiously. We have not commended it to 
others compellingly. We have not applied truth 
consistently in our presentation of theology and 
in listening to other peoples’—other communi-
ties’—stories. That we must repent of. Because 
we do not live up to the standard does not mean 
we throw away the standard and seek new ones or 
deny claims to any standard. “For the idea of truth 
is part of the intellectual oxygen we breathe.”19
(2) The truth of which we speak and from 
which we derive universal meaning is found in 
Scripture. Scripture is our basic source of evi-
dence because inspired and infallible. The text of 
Scripture yields its meaning absolutely and truly. 
We understand it neither truly nor exhaustively. 
We have grossly underestimated the noetic ef-
fects of sin if we have thought about it at all. We 
have used language wrongly. And there is a way in 
which we must listen better to the marginalized 
voices as we seek to appropriate biblical truth. I see 
Scripture as theology’s “foundation,” both proposi-
tional and functional.
(3) There is a transcendent metanarrative. The 
problem is in my telling of it, in my interpreta-
tion of it. Certain things are ontologically true. 
Not all evangelical theology can be written off to 
“the legacy of Protestant scholastic rationalism.” 
Who would have thought that the arms of the 
Princeton/Westminster theology had such a reach 
for the worse!20 If you are a broad-sweeping Nancey 
Murphy-style anti-foundationalist in theological 
construction, then Scripture can claim no author-
ity. In her world, narrative hermeneutic is to be 
applied to even the most didactic text.21 Doctrines 
were developed through history to shape the life of 
the Christian community. There lies in the biblical 
narrative the Christian worldview.
(4) But as a member of the community of faith 
I don’t interpret only in light of my own com-
munity. It is not the postmodern understanding 
of community-derived truth which coexists eas-
ily alongside other such truths. The comfortable 
coexistence of such truths entails a radical kind 
of relativism. But it is also recognizing that doc-
trines of the “community of faith” do not set the 
“rules for discourse,” as Kevin Vanhoozer has so 
rightly reminded us. Authority does not reside in 
how Christian readers of Scripture use Scripture; 
doctrinal authority derives from how the bibli-
cal authors, authorized by God’s Spirit, use terms 
such as “God,” “grace,” and “salvation.” This is 
how the transcendent metanarrative must be told. 
Vanhoozer’s approach preserves Scripture as the 
Church’s foundation of faith, retains the corre-
spondence theory of truth, and refreshingly—no, 
necessarily—reminds us of the Reformation prin-
ciple of the priesthood of individual believers in 
our efforts to do theology rightly because we have 
the capacity—and therefore the responsibility—to 
do it rightly. He says,
Right theological judgment is the product of  hu-
man cognitive action that has been nurtured by di-
vine canonical action concerning right covenantal 
relations. The canon is nothing less than a unique 
and indispensable framework—the spectacles of  
faith, as Calvin put it—that enables us faithfully 
to imagine (to see and to taste) the world as it is in 
Christ, the “wisdom of  God” (1 Cor. 1:24), or in 
other words, as it really is.22
(5) One more word on method, and that is hu-
mility. At times our approach has been triumphal. 
We have played fast and loose with the biblical 
message because it is the truth. But we have been 
unfaithful to the task to which we have been called. 
Have we arrogantly imposed our own (typically 
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Western) “narrative-based experience” on founda-
tional truth, even as we sought to share its propo-
sitional nature? A good argument could be made 
that the fundamental doctrines of the faith have 
been affirmed in an unwarranted triumphalism 
that has led to an arrogant elitism. Although there 
is a place for holy anger and righteous indignation 
(as Jesus himself showed us), such is typically not 
the winsome route. The epistemic humility virtu-
ously invoked by some post-structuralists—that 
you really can’t know anything for certain—I want 
to invoke too, but not as an apology by which I 
can now dismiss the indubitability of Christian 
theism. A new fresh humility can characterize our 
approach to both the appropriation and the prom-
ulgation of scriptural truth. There can be no doubt 
about its veracity.
(6) Finally, we view humanity as unified in its 
constitution. Perhaps the more radical postmod-
ernists are the product of the fragmentation of 
the unified individual? Why such a distinction 
between the intellect, the will, and the affections? 
It appears postmodernists would have us all be 
the epistemological fatalities of faculty psychol-
ogy, itself a late-Enlightenment emblem. But that 
is not how Scripture presents humanity created 
in God’s image-bearing capacity. This was always 
Princeton’s emphasis (Charles Hodge’s, especially). 
This was the grand presupposition of William 
Ames as he chafed against the Aristotelian division 
between knowing and doing, epistemology and 
ethics. This is where Ramus came in. Without this 
synergistic understanding of the faculties of hu-
manity, our understanding of reason will only be 
seriously attenuated. Reason is also moral and not 
merely rational. It is surely true that the Modern 
mind represents the best example in history of hu-
man pride in the exaltation of the human intellect. 
But it is the intellect engaging an outside author-
ity that makes it moral and “non-neutral.”23 Ames 
took Aristotle, brought the foundational truth of 
Scripture to bear, and with the pedagogically-ori-
ented epistemological equipment of Ramus, made 
it functional as well.24
In conclusion, I would suggest that we recov-
er the center as we apply these principles to our 
appropriation, understanding, and teaching of 
theology. And we will do this in community in a 
spirit of cooperation and humility as members of 
a community, that “community of those who seek 
truth,” to use Bloom’s phrase, that universal, su-
pracultural, timeless truth. And whether Bloom is 
right that “postmodernity is a fad,” much like the 
Atkins Diet appears to have been, perhaps news 
of its death is exaggerated. Whatever the case, we 
need to enter the conversation as disputants more 
than “conversers” because the “disputation mod-
el,” argues Vanhoozer, better captures the serious-
ness of the matter.25 
Meanwhile, I want to assert that in this dis-
putation model we can and must use Aristotle, 
Descartes, Pascal, and pre-existing epistemological 
methodology and categories to arrive at the truth 
as it is in Scripture. Only in Scripture are Pascal 
and Descartes not those “great opponents, whom 
no synthesis can unite.”26 We can use both to 
find God, not exclusively, but as one of our main 
food groups. And, at the very least, Foucault and 
Derrida provide interesting appetizers.
That’s my diet, and I’m sticking with it. Bon 
Appetit.
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